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For a country whose power and influence is unprecedented in the modern period, and 
whose unipolar dominance is routinely compared to ancient Rome’s,1 the events of 
September 11 came as a profound shock. Not only were the intelligence gathering and 
defensive capacities of the United States revealed to be inadequate and inappropriate 
for the sorts of threats confronted by the dominant power in the post-Cold War period, 
but the depth of animosity directed towards American people and values provided an 
unsettling counterpoint to the destruction itself. The idea, put forward by Francis 
Fukuyama and others,2 that American power might be encouraging an inexorable, 
global convergence around Western values, political practices and patterns of 
production and consumption increasingly looks like wishful thinking, liberal 
complacency, and the product of a failure to recognise the implications that flow from 
massive international inequalities of wealth and power. American hegemony is – 
rightly or wrongly – seen as responsible for a global order that entrenches the interests 
of a privileged Western elite whilst condemning a third of humanity to poverty.  In 
such circumstances, where hundreds of millions of people consider themselves to 
have little stake in the prevailing order, ‘ideologies of violence and mayhem’ may 
enjoy a degree of support and even legitimacy.3 
 
                                                 
1 See for example, Coral Bell ‘American ascendancy; and the pretence of concert’, The National 
Interest, Fall, 1999, pp 55-65. 
2 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1993). 
3 Benjamin R Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, (Ballentine Books, 2001), xiv. 
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A sense of inequality, powerlessness and impotence in the face of overwhelming 
power is hardly a new experience for the less powerful in any international system. 
What is distinctive about the contemporary period is that a growing sense of unease 
about the inherent inequality of the current system is occurring at a moment when 
there is a – frequently unfulfilled – expectation that such inequalities could, indeed 
should be addressed. The fundamental disconnect between the rhetoric of liberalism, 
democracy, human rights and security, on the one hand, and the reality of 
marginalisation and disadvantage on the other, fuels a growing chorus of opposition 
to an array of process subsumed under the rubric of ‘globalisation’.  For all the 
imprecision that frequently accompanies this term, these processes are closely 
associated with an America-centric world order that is seen as doing little to alleviate 
economic deprivation or to develop more inclusive patterns of global governance and 
political representation. On the contrary, America’s political influence, military might 
and economic power are frequently accused of undermining local culture and 
autonomy for little tangible benefit. 
 
Although there is some agreement about the sorts of underlying forces that gave rise 
to the events of September 11, the theoretical and policy implications that flow from 
them remain contentious - the US’s overwhelmingly military response 
notwithstanding.  In contrast to much of the orthodoxy that characterises 
contemporary theoretical and policy debates, we argue that there should be a 
recognition that the pursuit of security is a complex, multi-dimensional enterprise.  
For scholars working in the field of international political economy it has become 
increasingly apparent that in an era of ‘globalisation’ some of the comforting 
conceptual certainties of earlier periods are simply incapable of providing either 
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plausible explanations of how an increasingly interconnected, multi-actor world 
works or a basis for public policy. Consequently, we contend that unless security 
studies and practice begins to incorporate a more complex understanding of the 
contemporary international system, it will continue to be incapable of addressing 
many of the potential threats that confront even the most powerful states. 
 
The first part of this paper looks at the contested notion of ‘globalisation’, and the 
way that international society has been conceptualised in both the conventional 
security studies/international relations literature, and in the field of international 
political economy (IPE). One of the central claims we make here is that not only does 
the IPE literature help us to understand why many parts of the world feel disconnected 
from, and resentful about, the current international order, but some of the theoretical 
insights IPE has developed could usefully be adopted by security studies. At a time 
when state boundaries are becoming increasingly porous, and when the idea of 
discrete, self-contained nationally-based political and economic entities is becoming 
less sustainable, a conceptual and policy framework that continues to be informed by 
rigid national demarcations is unlikely to recognise, let alone respond to, threats that 
transcend or subvert national boundaries. The second part of the paper looks at the 
continuing influence of statecentric security discourses and highlights their inability to 
provide a conceptual framework for security provision in a global era.  Consequently, 
we argue that any serious attempt to address the underlying causes of terrorist threats 
cannot rely primarily on the efforts of the US – the country most closely associated 
with their development.  We suggest that rather than continuing to build security by 
constructing and defending boundaries between states or ‘us and them’ in an era when 
ideational and material boundary maintenance is all but impossible, a globalised 
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conception of security depends upon the construction of transnational security 
communities predicated on more widely accepted norms, values, interests and 
identities.   
 
Globalisation and Security 
 
One of the most striking aspects of September 11 was the coming together of worlds 
that IR scholars and policy practitioners tend to see as separate.  At both a theoretical 
and a policy level, there has been a tendency to assume that it is possible to 
distinguish between distinct geographic spheres, be it core and periphery, First and 
Third Worlds, or some other such schema that attempts to compartmentalise 
communities and reify the boundaries between them.   Such discourses tell us who 
‘we’ are (Western, democratic and free) and who ‘they’ are (Eastern, extremist, 
undemocratic and misguided).  They also tell us how we should act.4    
 
The great danger in constructing such ‘different worlds’ is that it lends intellectual 
support to simplistic sloganeering. George W. Bush’s attempt to demonise countries 
and regions as part of an ‘axis of evil’ is a clear example of the way in which 
language can be utilised to self-consciously construct or give shape to what might 
otherwise be frustratingly nebulous and elusive security threats.  Indeed, it is also 
important to point out that the attacks on the symbolic centres of American power 
                                                 
4 One of the statistical anomalies of the liberal democratic peace thesis is that whilst it is certainly true 
that democratic states (our ‘we-group’) tend not to fight each other those same states are much more 
likely to fight non-democracies (the ‘they-group’) than any other type of state. On the democratic peace 
thesis see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post Cold War World 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).  For a strident critique of this position, emphasising the 
militarism of liberal democracies and their proclivity to war see Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey (eds.), 
Democracy, Liberalism, and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate (London: Lynne Rienner, 
2001).   
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reflect a similar process of identity construction: American hegemony is associated 
with a morally corrosive world order that actively works against the interests of the 
Third World generally and the Arab world in particular.5 While both of these 
constructions may be little more than self-serving caricatures, they highlight the 
manner in which such discourses are mutually constitutive and construct powerful 
pictures of international society.   
 
Yet at a time when the ontological status of discrete national economies has become 
less certain as a consequence of pervasive transnational processes that are eroding 
national borders and control,6 IPE-oriented scholars have recognised that deciding 
‘who is us’ has become an increasingly problematic exercise.7 In both the practice and 
conceptualisation of security, by contrast, the increasingly uncertain and contested 
nature of nationally based identities is not only frequently ignored, but the active 
construction of distinct and opposed groups is a self-consciously pursued  discursive 
strategy. Defining who ‘we’ are not only helps shape ‘our’ values, interests  and 
behaviour, but it inevitably defines who ‘they’ are as well, and the sorts of policies 
that might be appropriate as a consequence. Even this kind of simplistic discursive 
bifurcation has become inherently more problematic and implausible, however. 
 
One of the most noteworthy  shortcomings of much strategic theorisation and practice 
is that it remains overwhelmingly state-centric.  According to some observers, the US 
is currently enjoying an unprecedented ‘unipolar moment’, with the potential ‘to last 
                                                 
5 Michael Mann ‘Globalisation and September 11’, New Left Review, 12, 2001, pp 51-72 
6 See Mark Beeson ‘Globalisation and international trade: international economic policies and “the 
national interest”’, in Boreham, P., Stokes, G. and Hall, R. (eds.), The Politics of Australian Society: 
Political Issues for the New Century, (Frenchs Forest: Longman, 2000), pp 213-31 
7 See Robert B. Reich. (1990) ‘Who is us?’, Harvard Business Review,  January/February. 
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for many decades’.8  The preservation of America’s dominant position is predicated 
upon ‘reassuring and engaging potential challengers’, who are invariably conceived as 
other states.9  However, such analyses ignore some of the most striking qualities of 
the contemporary ‘global’ era. First, in a world characterised by malleable borders 
and transnational networks, military might alone has been revealed as a blunt 
instrument  incapable of achieving desired outcomes in conflicts as diverse as  
Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Somalia.   Second, and more fundamentally, opponents of 
the contemporary world order include transnational networks (such as the ‘anti-
globalisation’ network and Al’Qaida) that make use of the products of globalisation 
(the internet, porous borders, cheap travel and communication) in order to oppose it.   
The state-centric ontology that informs traditional ways of thinking about and 
pursuing security fails to recognise that states are embedded in a complex web of 
institutions, 10 which while delivering them tangible benefits, places constraints on 
their autonomy and exposes them to new systemic vulnerabilities. The responsiveness 
of global stock-markets to security issues in the wake of September 11th highlights 
just how inter-connected more traditional security issues are with a deeply 
interconnected, but surprisingly fragile, international economic system. 
 
There are other compelling reasons for questioning whether a state-centric focus 
remains analytically or pragmatically useful. In a post-Cold War era in which direct 
conflict between the major powers is unthinkable,11 any recourse to the sorts of 
military challenges that have shaped Realist analyses of international contestation are 
                                                 
8 William C. Wohlforth ‘The stability of a unipolar world’, International Security, 24 (1) 1999, p 37. 
9 Michael Matsanundo ‘Preserving the unipolar moment: Realist theories and US grand strategy after 
the Cold War’, International Security, 21 (4), 1997,  p 83. 
10 G.J.  Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After 
Major Wars, (Princeton University Press, 2001). 
11 See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic 
Books, 1989). 
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quite simply redundant.12 What the events of September 11 demonstrate with 
devastating clarity is that in the contemporary era threats against the US and its allies 
will not emanate primarily from other states (not even ‘rogue’ states like North Korea 
or Iraq) but from an array of forces that operate outside of conventional state 
boundaries and auspices.  The September 11 terror was not delivered by missiles or 
armies.  The perpetrators arrived in the US quite legally on scheduled international 
flights.  The tools they used were American.  Although commentators have argued 
that only an organisation with state sponsorship would be capable of such an attack, 
the subsequent collapse of the Taliban made it clear that Al’Qaida was not dependent 
on the Taliban regime but that the Taliban regime (i.e. the Afghan state) was in fact 
dependent on Al’Qaida (a transnational network). Indeed, it has also become apparent 
that one of the more effective ways of combating such sub-state networks is by 
‘following the money trail’ and targeting the economic, rather than the military 
capacity of such organisations. 
 
Theorising global transformation 
The desire to impose analytical, and by extension political order on the world by 
constructing and reifying boundaries is not an exclusive preoccupation of so-called 
realists in particular, or traditional security studies more generally.  In IPE, world 
systems theorists have long claimed that the appropriate level of analysis should be 
global, and that the world is characterised by fundamental structural divisions 
between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’, which are a product of the inexorable expansion of 
                                                 
12 For one of the more influential and inaccurate predictions of state behaviour based on such 
assumptions, see Kenneth N. Waltz ‘The emerging structure of international politics’, International 
Security, 18 (2), 1993, pp 44-79. 
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capitalism.13 While this sort of demarcation may seem too crude to capture the 
complexity of either contemporary production structures, or the fact that some regions 
of the world have managed to escape from the ineluctable logic of dominant centres 
and exploited margins (and that centres and margins exist within as well as between 
societies),14 it does alert us the fact that the international order is distinguished by 
enduring inequalities of economic, as well as political and military power.  Moreover, 
it alerts us to the idea that the sources of those inequalities lay in transnational 
processes and relations rather than in competitions for power and prestige between 
securely bounded states. 
 
One way of attempting to conceptualise the post-Cold War order in which traditional 
great power rivalries appeared to have been, if not rendered redundant, then at least 
transmuted into economic and political contestation, 15  was Singer and Wildavsky’s 
depiction of ‘zones of peace and turmoil’. In this formulation zones of peace were 
composed of the 15% or so of wealthy, democratic nations found predominantly in 
Western Europe and North America, while the rest of the world’s population lived in 
zones of turmoil, where ‘poverty, war, tyranny and anarchy will continue to devastate 
lives’.16 Important as this recognition of global inequality and complexity was, it 
lends itself too readily to the sorts of simplistic depictions of insiders/outsiders, ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ that have come to characterise post September 11 discourse, and which 
have long been staples of much strategic theorising.  On the one hand the boundaries 
                                                 
13 See, Chris Chase-Dunn Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy, (Rowan and 
Littlefield, Lanham, 1998); Immanuel Wallerstein,  The Capitalist World-Economy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979) 
14 See Saskia Sassen (1991) The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo, (Princeton University Press). 
15 James M. Goldgeir and Michael McFaul ‘A tale of two worlds: Core and periphery in the post-cold 
war era’, International Organizatrion, 46 (2), 1992, pp 467-91 
16 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/ Zones of Turmoil, (New 
Jersey: Chatam House Publishers, 1993). 
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that this analysis is predicated on are empirically problematic.  More people are 
murdered each year in the US by other Americans than die violent deaths in most of 
what Singer and Wildasky describe as a ‘zone of turmoil’.  On the other hand, this 
bifurcation of the globe implies that agents within the ‘zone of peace’ are not 
implicated in constructing the turmoil that characterises the other world.17   
 
Supposedly peaceful liberal democratic states, institutions, and non-state actors are 
deeply implicated in this turmoil.  The diamonds fuelled war in Sierra Leone is driven 
largely by De Beers’ willingness to buy cheap diamonds from warlords.  The wars of 
Yugoslav succession and the collapse of the Somali state were caused in significant 
ways by the prior collapse of their economies that was in turn caused by IMF and 
World Bank demands for ‘economic restructuring’. Furthermore, the peace loving 
democracies of the West may inhabit a ‘zone of peace’ but constantly use their armed 
forces to fight wars in the ‘zone of turmoil’.  Since 1945, the US has invaded more 
states than anyone else, only occasionally with the approval of the UN.  Each year, the 
US and its allies drop thousands of tons of ordnance on Iraq without international 
authorisation.  Dividing the world into zones of peace and turmoil may help us to 
escape the fallacy of state-centrism by drawing attention to global transactions, but it 
does so at the cost of simply redrawing and reifying boundaries between ‘zones’, 
boundaries which are—like all boundaries—both conceptually and practically 
insecure.     
  
This is not to suggest that there are no discernible, enduring demarcations between the 
fortunate few and the marginalised majority. Plainly, there are. What it does suggest, 
                                                 
17 This point is developed further in Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian Responsibilities and 
Interventionist Claims in International Society’, Review of International Studies, (under review) 
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however, is that if we hope to understand the complex forces that shape and 
ultimately threaten the contemporary world order, we need to develop conceptual 
frameworks that allow us to identify the sources of inequality - and by extension, 
resentment – that currently threaten to undermine it. 
 
Even the more sophisticated frameworks noted above have difficulty accommodating 
some of the distinctive characteristics of the contemporary international system 
subsumed under the rubric of ‘globalisation’18. Although a systematic treatment of 
debates about globalisation is not possible here, a few points are worth briefly noting 
as they highlight the need for new thinking about security in particular and pubic 
policy more generally.  First, and contra Martin Shaw’s claim that globalisation ‘does 
not easily define an other’,19 one of the most striking qualities about globalisation is 
the persistence of difference and the continuing centrality of notions of ‘we and they’ 
in the construction of identity, values, interests, norms and hence appropriate action.  
Despite the undoubted importance of global media and the increasing sense of ‘time-
space compression’ that accompanies it,20 we are a long way from seeing the 
emergence of a global culture or community.  Indeed, media themselves are often 
used to propagate and reify bifurcated identities.  It is important to remember that 
most of the world’s population continues to live a predominantly agrarian existence 
that is only connected to wider global processes in intangible and attenuated ways. 
The connections that do exist are predominantly political-economic and invariably 
                                                 
18 See Held, David McGrew, Anthony, Goldblatt, David and Perraton, Johnathan Global 
Transformations, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
19 Martin Shaw Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
20 See David Harvey The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural 
Change. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). 
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negative. One of the paradoxical features of globalisation, therefore, is a concomitant 
process of fragmentation and an emphasis on difference and heterogeneity.21  
 
The second feature of globalisation to briefly note at this stage is the impact of global 
processes on state sovereignty – the enduring conceptual bedrock of much strategic 
thinking. As economic processes become increasingly transnational, and as new 
centres of political authority and power emerge in the inter-governmental institutions 
that are part of new patterns of transnational governance,22 the independence of states 
is inevitably compromised.  It is also worth noting that many of the world’s states, 
described by Robert Jackson as ‘quasi states’, have never had the freedom of action 
(both internal and external) and institutional capacity that are generally associated 
with statehood.23   More fundamentally, ‘political space for the development of 
effective government and the accountability of power is no longer coterminous with a 
delimited political territory’.24  In other words, one key element of globalisation is the 
shifting of authority ‘upwards’ towards supranational authorities, and ‘sideways’ to an 
array of non-state, frequently transnational actors that are assuming an increasingly 
prominent position in regulating cross-border activities.25 Significantly, and quite 
contrary to what much realist international relations scholarship might lead us to 
believe, therefore, the international system is not ‘anarchical’ – far from it. The 
system in which economic and political actors are currently embedded has arguably 
                                                 
21 Ian Clark Globalisation and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
22 See, James N Rosenau ‘Governance in the Twenty-first century’, Global Governance, 1, 1995, pp 
13-43 
23 See Robert Jasckson, Qusai States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Mark Beeson (forthcoming) ‘Sovereignty under 
siege: Globalisation and the state in Southeast Asia’, Third World Quarterly. 
24 David Held and Anthony McGrew ‘The end of the old order? Globalization and prospects for world 
order’, Review of International Studies, 24, p 235. 
25 See, Susan Strange The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); A.C. Cutler, V. Haufler, V., and Tony Porter, ( eds.) 
Private Authority in International Affairs, (New York: State University of New York, 1999). 
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never been more regulated – despite the prevalence of free market rhetoric.26  
However, the capacity of actors to shape the rules and institutions that are part of new 
structures of global governance varies dramatically. Unsurprisingly, the counties of 
rich, developed world, led by the US are the principal architects of this international 
order. 
 
Thus, although the notion of globalisation may be somewhat imprecise, it does alert 
us to processes and patterns of behaviour that are at once both distinctively 
contemporary and contradictory, and which need to be incorporated into security 
practices if effective analyses and responses are to contemporary threats are to be 
developed. Although the governance of the international system is beyond the control 
of any country, no matter how powerful, one country is – correctly – seen as having 
much more influence in the construction and operation of the emergent global system 
than any other. For globalisation’s discontents, who take the emergent global order to 
be synonymous with American order, attacks on the US – be they rhetorical or actual 
– are the all too predictable consequences of American hegemony. 
 
The Paradoxes of American Hegemony 
 
To suggest that the US is the most powerful country on earth and the lynchpin of the 
contemporary international order is hardly controversial.27 And yet, in a ‘global’ era, 
                                                 
26 It is important to note that the spread and operation of global capitalism depends on an 
accommodating regulatory environment that provides predictably, legality and the protection of private 
property rights. The contemporary period is characterised by new forms of regulation, not 
‘deregulation’. See Philip G. Cerny, ‘The limits of deregulation: Transnational interpenetration and 
policy change’, European Journal of Political Research, 19, 1991, pp 173-96. 
27 This is not as anodyne an observation as it might seem given the predictions of US decline that were 
so prevalent in the 1980s. See, Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic 
Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage, 1989). 
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even such an apparently unremarkable and bland assertion needs to be accompanied 
by a number of important caveats. First, there is an analytical question to be asked 
about precisely which ‘United States’ we might have in mind when we consider the 
impact of US-based interests on the international system. Second, whether or not it is 
possible for ‘the US’ to impose its collective will, it is plainly seen as being primarily 
responsible for the construction of a particular sort of world order, one that is judged 
by many outside of the privileged core of wealthy democracies to discriminate against 
those in the periphery. In other words, there are plainly costs as well as benefits 
associated with hegemony, especially in an era where the capacity of non-state actors 
to attack the emblems of American military and economic power is greatly enhanced.  
Third, in a global and interdependent era, the military, economic and political might 
of the US is - to some extent, at least - constrained.  As the persistence of communism 
in Cuba shows, even a global hegemon cannot simply coerce its opponents through 
force of arms.  
 
Such caveats notwithstanding, the world order that America currently dominates 
attracts a good deal of hostility. To understand why, we need to look more closely at 
the institutional structures that have emerged under US auspices since the Second 
World War. Although it is customary to make an analytical distinction between the 
political, economic and strategic dimensions of this order, we argue that this is a 
mistake for three reasons.  
 
First, security encompasses a range of issues that transcend simple military capacity.  
An important debate in security studies at the beginning of the 1990s showed that 
even if we accept that security means ‘freedom from fear or harm’ it encompasses a 
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much broader set of issues than merely military security against invasion by 
neighbours.  As early as 1983, Barry Buzan’s seminal People, States and Fear 
pointed to five domains of security: the military, social, economic, political and 
environmental.28  This opening of security studies has turned our attention towards the 
fact that military and statist solutions do little to address the threats that make most 
people insecure.29  Focusing on human security rather than state security highlights 
issues that actually make people insecure - poverty, malnutrition, and people’s own 
states being the most important - and suggests strategies for overcoming them.30  
‘Fetishising’ the military and the state31 does not offer strategies for overcoming 
human insecurity.  Indeed, the appropriation of resources for military spending 
redirects resources away from the sorts of human development projects that do offer 
the possibility of alleviating insecurity.  Read this way, the provision of military 
security is more often part of the problem than the solution.   
 
Second, American power, especially but not exclusively during the Cold War period, 
has been associated with the consolidation of a particular neoliberal economic order, 
an order critics claim systematically disadvantages the developing world.  
Significantly, the economic dimension of American hegemony is interwoven and 
interdependent on its military, political and ideational elements.  The so-called 
‘American way of war’, for example, combines high technology and the use of 
                                                 
28 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post 
Cold-War Era, 2nd edition (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).  
29 For an overview of the many different strands of security studies in the 1990s see Steve Smith, ‘The 
Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years’, in Suart 
Croft and Terry Terriff (eds.), Critical Reflections on Security and Change (London: Frank Cass, 
2000), pp. 72-101. 
30 This argument is put forward by Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald, ‘ “The Utility of Human 
Security:” Which Humans? What Security?  A Reply to Thomas and Tow’, Security Dialogue, 2002.   
31 This term is Richard Wyn Jones’.  See Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 1999).  
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economic power with liberal ideas about precision and efficiency.32  More 
importantly, global compliance with this neo-liberal order is not just about coercion 
and force.  Rather, as Karl Deutsch pointed out in the 1970s, any system of rules 
depends upon ‘habitual voluntary compliance’.33  Although the international order is 
underpinned by the threat of coercive measures (be they military, economic or 
political), an essentially rule-based system depends upon high levels of voluntary 
compliance. Consequently, one of the most important and defining qualities of US 
hegemony and the neo-liberal order it supports are the complex web of military, 
economic and political institutions and organisations that promulgate and reinforce 
the ideas, practices and norms of the contemporary era.34   
 
Third, the interweaving of more narrowly conceived strategic questions with wider 
systemic issues revolving around issues of development and equality highlights the 
fact that security concerns can no longer be confined within national borders. In a 
‘global’ era in which an array of processes  routinely transcend national borders in 
ways that have undermined the very utility of ‘the national economy’ as a discrete 
conceptual entity, and at a time when the actions of other states and non-state actors 
impinge more directly on ‘national’ affairs, security policy needs to reflect a much 
wider range of factors if it is to underpin order and predictability.  Security issues are 
no longer the preserve states, militaries and their accompanying ‘zero sum’ logic, as 
recent events vividly remind us. And yet such traditional approaches to security have 
                                                 
32 See Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the Military (London: Macmillan, 
1975). 
33 Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968), pp. 
19-22. 
34 Stepehen Gill, (1995) ‘Globilisation, market civilisation, and disciplinary neoliberalism’, 
Millennium, 24 (3): 399-423. 
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been central components of the international system American hegemony helped to 
create. 
 
The post-war international order 
The post-World War II international order that the US played such a fundamental part 
in helping to construct created the conditions within which a more deeply integrated 
international system could develop. Although a detailed consideration of this period 
and the consolidation of American power associated with it is not possible here,35 it is 
worth emphasising some important characteristics because they continue to shape 
contemporary events and help us understand both US hegemony and the resentment it 
engenders. 
 
The post war global economy was shaped by an international consensus on the need 
for international economic management.  However, the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system, coupled with the increased influence of American dominated inter-
governmental institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, and the World Trade Organisation, has led to a growing chorus of criticism 
from within both the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ economies. Critics argue that 
powerful agencies like the IMF are dominated by the US, and actively promote a neo-
liberal agenda that favours American economic interests.36  Some writers, for 
instance, argue that Western aid to Third World countries is often designed in such a 
way that the only interests they serve are those of the donors and the local elites.37 
                                                 
35 See, Robert Latham, The Liberal moment: Modernity, Security, and the Making of Postwar 
International Order, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 
36 Ngarie Woods ‘Order, globalization, and inequality in world politics’, in Andrew Hurrell and  Ngaire 
Woods (eds.), Inequality, Globalisation and World Politics, (Oxford University  Press, 1999), pp 8-35. 
37 Rita Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa 
(London: Zed Books, 2000). 
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Similarly, it is claimed, the WTO fails to take the specific concerns of the developing 
world seriously, consistently allowing the US and the European Union to dominate a 
reform agenda that allows continuing protectionism in the wealthy world, while 
simultaneously forcing open markets and imposing new regulatory regimes in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America.38  Although there is no simple causal relationship between 
American trade policy – despite its increasingly unilateralist style – and the attacks on 
the World Trade Centre in particular or anti-Americanism more generally. 
Nevertheless, there are identifiable and enduring structures in the global political 
economy that systematically disadvantage countries that are either attempting to break 
into more lucrative economic niches or, in more desperate situations, simply escape 
from grinding poverty.39 In either case, a connection is frequently made between 
continuing deprivation and the existence of a global economic order dominated by the 
US.40  
 
It is not being claimed here that the US is either intentionally seeking to cause or 
prolong the immiseration of the developing world. Although die-hard realists might 
argue that in a zero-sum game of international competition it may be wise to constrain 
the economic development of potential rivals, the dynamics of an increasingly 
transnational economy are not amenable to the systematic control of any single state, 
no matter how powerful. America’s ‘national interest’ is socially constructed, highly 
contested, historically contingent and reflects an array of domestic influences that 
                                                 
38 Martin Khor, ‘The World Trade Organization and the South: Implications of the emerging global 
economic governance for development’, in Jomo, K.S. and Nagaraj, S. (eds.), Globalization versus 
Development, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp 59-84. 
39 See Mark Beeson and Stephen Bell ‘The strong and the weak in world capitalisms: Structures, 
institutions and agency in the international political economy’,  in Phillips, N. (ed.),  Globalising IPE, 
(London: Palgrave), forthcoming. 
40 See, for example, Natasha Bita ‘Poorest nations fight US on trade’, The Australian, June 12th, 2002, 
p 9. 
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make the construction of a consistent, coherent and inclusive foreign policy inherently 
problematic.41 A variety of non-state actors like financial markets, ratings agencies, 
private sector regulatory authorities, to say nothing of ‘American’ multinational 
corporations that may privilege profit over patriotism, mean that even US 
policymakers may find their autonomy constrained in ways that complicate the 
construction of policy.42  
 
Such caveats are not, however, meant to imply that particular interests primarily based 
in the US are not the principal beneficiaries of new global regulatory regimes that 
privilege the interest of an increasingly global transnational elite. Clearly, they do, 
and increasingly so. Yet, the emergence of a transnational governing elite is a 
complex and pervasive process, and one that is not confined to, or exclusively 
controlled by, the US.43 The key point to emphasise, then, is that the US has found 
itself blamed for a variety of ills that have complex transnational antecedents. 
Ironically enough, therefore, in a world in which states are still taken to be the 
ontological bedrock of an increasingly integrated system of international relations, the 
US finds itself targeted as the embodiment of an order that is – rightly – seen as doing 
little to alleviate international inequality.  
 
A second key feature of the post war international order was the Cold War and the 
rise to dominance of realist and neorealist conceptions of international relations.  The 
early, ‘classical’, realism of Hans Morgenthau, Thomas Schelling and others was 
                                                 
41 Trubowitz, P (1998) Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign 
Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
42 For an overview of the new transnational regulatory order, see John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos 
Global Business Regulation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
43 William Robinson, and J. Harris ‘Towards a global ruling class? Globalization and the transnational 
capitalist class’, Science & Society, 64 (1), 2000, pp 11-54. 
 19
explicitly concerned with understanding how best to secure the US and its democratic 
way of life from the Soviet threat.44  For Morgenthau, the legitimacy and efficacy of a 
realist world view was predicated on two assumptions.  First, it was assumed that the 
American way of life was better than other ways of life, particularly communist and 
fascist ways.  Second, Morgenthau and other realists assumed that the world beyond 
state borders was an ungovernable anarchy in which power and military force were 
the only currencies.  A state that was not able to protect itself militarily by being self-
sustaining would soon come under attack from irredentist states and would cease to 
exist.  Given that the American state was the guarantor of the American way of life, 
the challenge for US security studies in the Cold War was to devise ways of 
protecting the state from the Soviets.  In the 1970s and afterwards, realism was 
supplanted by neo-realism as the dominant discourse in American security circles.45   
 
Neo-realism replaced the idea that the pursuit of power was necessary to preserve a 
particular way of life, with the notion that it was an objective and inevitable product 
of an anarchical international system.  States simply had to act in particular ways 
(maximising power, seeking balances, engaging in deterrence), in accordance with the 
laws of international anarchy, because failure to do so would bring about their 
destruction.  This logic emanated not from the contingencies of a particular historical 
epoch or from the exigencies of protecting a particular way of life but from a 
scientific and objective assessment of the fundamental laws of international relations. 
 
                                                 
44 See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edition (New 
York: McGraw Hill, 1985) and Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale: Yale University Press, 
1967).  
45 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Relations (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). 
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Although neo-realist logic has been exposed as being deeply flawed46 it shaped 
American security thinking in the Cold War.  US security policy-making underwent a 
brief neo-liberal interlude during the Clinton era, evidenced by subtle shifts toward 
humanitarianism and multilateralism in security affairs, but neo-realism is evidently 
one of the key influences on George W. Bush’s security policy making entourage.  
The neo-realist view of the world shapes the way that the US sees itself, sees other 
people, and sees the scope of appropriate action in world politics.  Although it is a 
product of the Cold War, its logic can still be seen shaping US policy today. 
 
If the world is an ungovernable anarchy inhabited by estranged foreigners, as 
neorealist thinking suggests,  the best way to provide security is the acquisition and 
use of military force.  During the Cold War this fuelled the terrifying ideas of nuclear 
deterrence and ‘mutually assured destruction’ which were predicated on the belief the 
without nuclear weapons the Soviet Union would have inevitably invaded western 
Europe.  The same logic has continued after the Cold War.  Whilst many Europeans 
have begun to ask what the armed forces are for, concluding that today they should be 
as much about responding to global humanitarian emergencies as the defence of the 
state,47 the US responded to the very new type of threat posed by September 11 by 
increasing its expenditure on defence.  In 2001, US defence spending stood at $329 
billion and by 2003 it will be $396 billion.48  The lion’s share of this will be spent on 
conventional military items, including an increase for the National Missile Defence 
budget.  
                                                 
46 Not least, see Richard Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, International Organization, 38 (2), 
1984, pp. 225-286 and Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics’, International Organisation, 46 (2), pp. 391-426. 
47 See Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster (eds.), Democratic Control of the 
Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards (London: Palgrave, 2002). 
48 Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Rumsfeld’s Defence Vision’, Survival, 44 (2), 2002, p. 108. 
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Neo-realist logic is also sceptical about the benefits of international cooperation and 
multilateralism, a perspective that has directly influenced the approach of the Bush 
administration on a number of issues.  Because states only ever pursue a narrowly 
conceived notion of self-interest, cooperation is only possible in the short term and in 
relation to particular issues, neorealism implies.  According to this view, cooperation 
always risks attracting free riders and offers the opportunity for other states to secure 
relative gains, therefore states should be very wary of multilateralism.  Thus, the US 
under Bush has backed away from the Kyoto environmental protocol, the 
International Criminal Court, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. Somewhat 
ironically, however, the perceived necessity of constructing a colation to fight the 
‘war on terror’ has demonstrated the limits to and potential costs of unilateralism for 
even the most powerful states 
 
Two key aspects of the post war international order generally, and the US role in it in 
particular, are worth highlighting as they help us unravel the relationship between 
security and globalisation after September 11.  On the one hand, IPE teaches us that 
US hegemony is bound up with, dependent on, and to some extent constrained by, a 
complex array of institutions, ideas, relationships and practices that define the 
contemporary international order.49  Thus, rather than enjoying direct and 
unproblematic hegemony over its dominions, as ancient Rome did, its authority and 
influence are embedded in interdependent increasingly transnational networks of 
power and interest.  Even the exercise of its overwhelming military power is 
dependant on a series of other relationships.  The US cannot claim legitimacy for its 
military actions on the basis of self-referential imperial glory, as the Romans or more 
                                                 
49 For a provocative and original analysis of American power, see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
(2000) Empire, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). 
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recently the British did.  Instead, it has to justify its use of force by recourse to 
justificatory discourses constructed over time by international society.  Although the 
US played a key role in constructing those discourses, which include discourses of 
humanitarianism, self-defence and just war,50 it finds itself constrained by them.   
 
A second feature of the post war international order is the continuing influence of 
realism and neo-realism on American security politics.  Realism and neorealism have 
shaped the way that policy makers see the world, teaching them to view it in terms of 
states that can be separated into ‘we and they’ groups inhabiting an anarchical 
environment.  Such security discourses are predicated on the construction of threats 
which emanate from outside51 and the vilification of the other.52  According to this 
realist logic, the most appropriate way to respond to the threats inherent in the 
international system is to secure the sovereign boundaries that form the objective 
bedrock of international life.  Such boundaries are best secured through military 
power.  Yet such thinking looks increasingly unrealistic given the nature of threats to 
the contemporary international orders, of which the events of September 11th are the 
quintessential expression. 
               
Rethinking Security in a Global Era 
There are, then, a number of paradoxes and contradictions that characterise the 
contemporary ‘global’ system that merit emphasis because they have implications for 
                                                 
50 See Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian War in International Society (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) and Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in 
International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
51 On the social construction of danger and threat as a prerequisite for building security policy see 
David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 2nd edition 
(London: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) 
52 Matt McDonald, ‘Sovereignty, Identity, and Security’, paper presented at the 2002 APSA 
conference. 
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the way that security is both conceptualised and operationalised. The first point to 
emphasise is that despite the US’s undoubted unique capacity to shape the security 
and trade regimes that are central parts of contemporary governance mechanisms,53 
there are limits to, and costs associated with American hegemony. On the one hand, 
resistance to US power and the neoliberal order it is implicated in reproducing is not 
confined to dramatic incidents like Septometer 11. On the contrary, the growth of 
what has been described as ‘transnational civil society’ is not simply a function of a 
more pervasive process of boundary erosion and transnational integration, but has in 
part been fuelled by a desire to promote alternative agendas and circumvent what are 
taken to be unrepresentative and ineffective political structures.54 While there may be 
doubts about the efficacy of such alternative political movements,55 and little reason 
to suppose that international non-governmental organisations will necessarily be 
‘progressive’,56 it is important to recognise that processes of globalisation are 
simultaneously undermining the legitimacy of existent order and placing further 
constraints on the ability of even the most powerful states to act unilaterally. 
 
Likewise, the possible costs of the ill-conceived application of American power were 
apparent even before September 11.  In this regard, Chalmers Johnson’s book 
Blowback, although either generally derided or ignored when released, looks 
remarkably prescient in retrospect. ‘Blowback’ was a term coined by the Central 
Intelligence Agency to describe  ‘the unintended consequences of policies that were 
                                                 
53 See, Mark Beeson ‘The construction of international regimes in post-crisis Asia: Coercion, 
consensus and collective goods’, in Sargeson, S. (ed.), Shaping Common Futures: Case Studies of 
Collective Goods, Collective Actions in East and Southeast Asia, (London: Routledge, 2002), pp 25-40. 
54 See, M.E. Keck and Katherine  Sikkink  Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
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UN World Conferences on the environment, human rights, and women’, World Politics, 1998, 51: 1-
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kept secret from the American people’.57 As Johnson points out, the chief suspect in 
the World Trade Centre attack – Osama bin Laden – was largely a creation of the 
US’s own secretive geo-political manoeuvrings designed to drive the Soviet Union 
from Afghanistan. Even if it is argued that the US’s grand strategy during the Cold 
War was ultimately vindicated by the collapse of its principal adversary, there are 
clearly significant long-term costs and unforseen consequences that flow from such 
actions. Recent events suggest a return to Cold War style practises with the division 
of the world into implacably opposed camps – this time based on ‘good’ and ‘evil’ 
rather than political ideology – with a concomitant support for regimes of any sort as 
long as they either acquiesce to, or actively support American policy.58 At a time 
when the US is developing a new, unilateral security doctrine based on pre-emptive 
strikes against perceived enemies this is an especially troubling prospect.59  
 
To avoid recreating the Manichean divisions of the Cold War and entrenching a 
global order associated with enduring inequalities, it is necessary to fundamentally re-
think the way that security is conceived and achieved in a global era.  Rethinking the 
theory and practice of security after September 11 needs to be based on an 
acknowledgement that ‘security’ is a normative goal rather than an instrumental 
object.  ‘Securitization’ politics60 (the politics of making a political issue a ‘security’ 
issue warranting special measures) depends upon identity (who or what are ‘we’ 
trying to secure?), the construction of threat (what is it we are trying to secure 
                                                 
57 Chalmers Johnson Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, (London: Little, 
Brown). 
58 George W Bush’s insistence that countries are either ‘for’ or ‘against’ America and the ‘war on 
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60 The idea of ‘securitization’ is expanded in Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A 
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ourselves against?) and delineation of appropriate measures to deal with the threat.  
All too often after September 11, the US administration has reached for neo-realist 
answers to these questions, seemingly oblivious to the fact that it is a combination of 
its hegemonic position within the neo-liberal world order and the politics of 
estrangement produced by neo-realist security practices that made the US the 
symbolic and actual focus for opposition to various aspects of globalisation.  In order 
to pursue a security politics more appropriate for a global era it is important to move 
away from the assumption of objectivism that lies at the heart of neo-realism.   
Instrumental  security policies which assume a world of unchanging objective 
variables cannot recognise, let alone address the sorts of threats that are emerging 
from non-state actors and opponents of American power. 
 
The neo-realist security politics adopted by the Bush regime excludes politics by 
making the existence of threat and the appropriate solutions appear somehow natural.  
The world, as they see it, is full of ‘intractable security dilemmas’.61  But just as the 
‘balance of power’ only exists if states believe it exists and act as if it does, so the 
existence of threat and the level of appropriate response is socially constructed and 
malleable.62  Consequently, neo-realist security practices exacerbate (and in some 
cases create) the very problems they claim to be addressing: the politics of 
estrangement, boundary construction, and militarism contributes to the creation of 
self-fulfilling prophecies.  In its ‘security dilemma’ form63 the US builds up its 
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military forces because it believes itself to be militarily threatened by other states, 
particularly so-called ‘rogues’.  But American militarism makes likely targets such as 
Iraq and North Korea feel insecure prompting them to develop their own defensive 
military capacities in whatever way they can.  Paradoxically enough, therefore, US 
policy is implicated in exacerbating conventional state-based security threats, whilst 
simultaneously paying insufficient attention to increasingly important ones that 
emanate from outside the conventional state-based order.   
 
Thus, neo-realist security practices have a limited capacity to comprehend or provide 
strategies for dealing with the types of problems encountered in a world of complex 
networks and ‘transversal’ relationships.64  Neo-realist security practices are 
predicated upon a conceptualisation of international order that remains centred  on 
sovereign boundaries and clear distinctions between ‘self’ and ‘other’.  What 
September 11 demonstrated is that not only are those boundaries theoretically and 
practically insecure, but so is the security politics that is based on them.     
   
Concluding remarks 
A number of key insights flow from the foregoing analysis that can help us begin 
rethinking the way security is pursued in a global era.  Most fundamentally, we need 
to recognise that the contemporary  international order is irredeemably post-
Westphalian, and that the international is a socially constructed space in which the 
pursuit of security is as much normative as it is instrumental. What the events of 
September 11th demonstrate, however, are the limits to both American hegemony and 
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security. The values and norms that constitute international society and drive 
processes associated with globalisation clearly remain contested and resited. In such 
circumstances, three issues are central to any re-thinking of security. 
 
First, it needs to be recognised that globalisation is not just about increased flows 
between territorially distinct units, but also represents a more fundamental challenge 
to the spatial logic of international relations.  The ‘weapons systems’ of September 11 
were launched from the eastern seaboard of the US, not from across its borders.  The 
perpetrators and their supporters were citizens of numerous countries.  Most of the 
perpetrators had been educated in the US and some were even US citizens.  The target 
was not the military capacity of the US but the symbols of its global hegemony.  The 
fact that so many victims were non-American also reminds us that US power is 
embedded in transnational networks that transcend national boundaries.  A new 
security politics needs to recognise the increasingly meaningless separation of the 
‘domestic’ and the ‘international’ that informs so much conventional security 
thinking.65 
   
Secondly, security needs to be pursued in ways that do not reify identity in terms of 
‘self’ and ‘other’, ‘us’ and them’.  Much of what makes people insecure, such as 
malnutrition and environmental degradation, cannot be dealt with by a single political 
community and cannot be attributed to the deliberate actions of a single ‘other’.  
Rather than ‘us and them’, ‘good and evil’, we need to appreciate that the world is 
tied together by complex networks and transactions that transcend or subvert borders, 
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and which render simple binary oppositions redundant.  Thus, the insecurity we feel 
as a result of September 11 is intimately linked to the sense of insecurity we create in 
other people.  Continuing to ignore the mutually constitutive aspects of security only 
exacerbates this problem by increasing the insecurity of others and hence ourselves.  
Because security is subjective, comprehensive security can only be built on the basis 
of inter-subjective agreement about what makes us insecure and how we can deal with 
it.  The wider the agreement—in terms of the breadth and depth of a global dialogic 
security community—the ‘better’ the knowledge claims it would produce.  Ideally, 
such knowledge would be based on free and open dialogue between agents and the 
construction of transnational, indeed transversal, moral communities.66  Only in this 
way can we escape the perpetual construction of bifurcated identities that foster 
insecurity.      
 
Finally, the provision of sustainable security would seem to require approaches that 
go beyond traditional  militarism and the zero-sum logic of neo-realism.  When the 
most powerful military apparatus ever assembled is incapable of protecting its citizens 
from attack, it is hardly radical to question its efficacy or the appropriateness of  the 
strategic doctrine that underpins it. Similarly, it is hardly controversial to suggest the 
new threats that confront the US are generated in large part by enduring disparities of 
economic opportunity that American power is seen as having helped create.  
Strategies that attempt to respond to such threats without addressing their complex, 
multi-dimensional sources will consequently prove ineffective. At the economic level, 
therefore, the challenge will be to increase the degree of interdependence across the 
world, so that it resembles the wealthy western world’s in both intensity and outcome. 
                                                 
66 These themes are developed further in Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Pragmatic Solidarism and the Dilemmas of 
Humanitarian Intervention’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 31 (3), 2002, forthcoming. 
 29
Paradoxically, economic globalisation may not have gone far enough. But unless the 
integration of hitherto marginalised parts of the international system occurs happens 
on a more equitable basis, and unless the same logic of interdependence can be 
extended to the construction of new regimes of security, which recognise that security 
is mutually constitutive and interdependent, then security is unlikely to prove 
sustainable. 
 
  
